Is Christianity a Paradox?

I am not an athletic person by any means. The most athletic thing I have ever done was training for and running a charity 5K when I was in the tenth grade.

Never again.

I almost died.

It was terrible.

While I certainly have very little knowledge when it comes to the world of athletics, I know what the overall goal of most athletes is: winning the game. In many ways, such a mindset is similar to how we as average people go about our daily lives. We work hard to reach the goals we set for ourselves in order to achieve maximum success and “win the race”. Because this method of life is perfectly logical, what could we possibly make of a religion that teaches the exact opposite? If it is in our human nature to seek individual prosperity, how do we go about accepting a religion that teaches us to sacrifice our success and security for the betterment of others? Is not such a religion a paradox in relation to our human nature?

Friedrich Nietzsche writes copiously on this topic in his work The Anti-Christ. Infuriated with the seemingly illogical theology of Christianity, Nietzsche concludes that “active sympathy for the ill-constituted and weak—Christianity” is “more harmful than any vice” (Nietzsche 128) and dedicates his work to attempting to convince his readers of the flaws, dangers, and paradoxical nature of the religion. Utilizing a Darwinian approach to moralism, an empiricist view of the nature of God, sin, and redemption, and a scientific proof against the idea of a human deity, Nietzsche dismantles the paradox of the Christian religion and pressures his readers to do the same.

Nietzsche’s first proof against Christianity involves the idea of good verses bad. He writes: “What is good?—All that heightens the feeling of power, the power to will, power itself in man. What is bad?—All that proceeds from weakness” (Nietzsche 127). According to Nietzsche, who closely follows the ideas of Darwin in that man is nothing more than a mere evolution, individual power is the ultimate good in life and essentially, our source of happiness. Humans naturally crave power and seek individual success and security. A single glance into the Gospels, however, and one can easily see how Christ’s message was the inverse of human nature. Christ explicitly called His followers to live meek, selfless lives, placing others before at all times. It is because of this contradiction between human nature and Christianity that Nietzsche deems Christianity the “religion of pity”, concluding that, “Christianity has taken the side of everything weak, base, and ill-constituted, it has made an ideal out of opposition to the preservation instincts of strong life…” (Nietzsche 129-130). Essentially, Nietzsche claims that because basic Christianity violates our human nature of individualism, it is invalid. 

A second reason Nietzsche attacks Christianity has to do with Christ’s promise of redemption, as well as the very nature of God. Christianity proclaims that all who confess their sins and dedicate their lives to Christ will be redeemed from their trespasses by God Himself. While this may sound promising, Nietzsche argues that the idea of forgiven sins from an invisible god is flawed because sins and deities are purely “imaginary”. “In Christianity,” he writes, “neither morality nor religion come into contact with reality at any point. Nothing but imaginary causes (‘God’, ‘soul’, ‘ego’, ‘spirits’, ‘free will’—or “unfree will): nothing but imaginary effects (‘sin’, ‘redemption’, ‘grace’, ‘punishment’, ‘forgiveness of sins’) (Nietzsche 137). Essentially, Nietzsche claims Christianity lacks credibility due to its dependence on a plethora of invisible aspects. This idea that we cannot truly believe in something that is imaginary (something we cannot physically experience), is known as empiricism, and demands the belief that we cannot see sin, nor experience physically redemption, therefore, neither one exists. Using this empirical method of thinking, Nietzsche contrasts Christianity to Buddhism, claiming that Buddhism results in actual happiness as opposed to promised happiness (Nietzsche 166). Buddhism, referenced generously throughout the book, is viewed as “a hundred times more realistic than Christianity”, because it deals with physical realms as opposed to “imaginary” ones. In fact, Nietzsche explicitly remarks that Buddhism is more credible than Christianity because the concept of an “invisible God” had already been abolished by the founding of Buddhism (Nietzsche 141).

Perhaps the most effective attack Nietzsche uses against Christianity addresses the death of Christ. “The word ‘Christianity’” he argues, “is already a misunderstanding—in reality there has been only one Christian, and he died on the Cross. The ‘Evangel’ died on the Cross” (Nietzsche 163). Here, Nietzsche is highlighting the fact that Christ was considered a deity, however, He died a purely physical death on a cross, something a deity should not be able to experience because of their spiritual nature. Therefore, when Christ died, so did everything He taught. “For the Evangel has been precisely the existence, the fulfillment, the actuality of this ‘kingdom’,” he proclaims, “Such a death was precisely this ‘kingdom of God’” (Nietzsche 165). Essentially, what Nietzsche is arguing is that Christ was the actuality (the physical aspect) of God’s kingdom. When He died a corporeal death, however, He forfeited His proof of deity, and the kingdom of God, had such a kingdom existed in the first place, entirely collapsed. From here, Nietzsche claims that the so-called Christians who came after the death of Christ, specifically the apostle Paul, were responsible for either fabricating or blindly believing lies about the life and resurrection of Jesus (Nietzsche 166-167). 

Each of the arguments Nietzsche presents—the fact that Christianity clashes with human nature, the lack of actuality in the matter of sins and God, and the death of Christianity, all center around the idea that Christianity is a paradox. It requires us to treat others beyond what is in our nature. It asks us to believe in a god and a system of redemption that we cannot physically experience, and it bases said system of redemption on the impossible death of a deity. How do those of us who have chosen to believe in this seemingly absurd religion deal with an argument such as Neitzsche’s? There are two ways that Nietzsche’s seemingly logical argument can be deflated, and both ways include our human nature.

First, we as humans have a certain morality instilled in us that no other species of living beings does. While Nietzsche points out that it is in our nature as humans to strive for individual success, he seems to forget that all of us have a basic sense of common morality. This basic morality is what separates us from animals, aids in disproving the idea of evolution, and essentially lends itself to proof of a Creator. Even if physical evolution of species were entirely possible, evolution of morality is far less credible than a sovereign God who created morality. A second proof against Nietzsche’s argument also highlights human nature and intellect. As mentioned in Rene Descartes’ A Discourse on the Method, the mere fact that humans can fathom a perfect being such as God is proof for His existence. While Descartes acknowledges that nothing in nature is absolutely perfect, he is able to deduce that “the more perfect should proceed from and depend on the less perfect” (Descartes 29-30). Descartes is then able to link this to the idea of God saying that man had been created by a nature that was more perfect that one could fathom, which had to be God (Descartes 30).

 Nietzsche views Christianity as an impediment on human nature. While it is perhaps in our primal nature to “win the race” as the athletes mentioned at the beginning of the essay, Christianity calls us to a higher standard of virtue of putting others before ourselves. Perhaps there are some seemingly paradoxical aspects of Christianity, but none of them overrule the fact that humans are moral beings who can consciously fathom the idea of a perfect and holy God.